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Adult Survivors of Childhood Sexual Abuse
Seeking Compensation From Their Abusers:
Are Illinois Courts Fairly Applying the
Discovery Rule to All Victims?
INTRODUCTION

hildren have been sexually abused in all cultures throughout
history.! Although the abuse has not changed, society's attitude
towards it has. We no longer live in a time where children are
property whose rights can be easily violated.2 Children are now seen as a
valuable part of our community, and there is no doubt that childhood sexual
abuse is a heinous act of violence that is looked down upon in our society.
It is well known that adults are not to have sexual relationships with
children. It is not acceptable for a father to force his own daughter to
perform oral sex. It is not acceptable for a teacher or a preacher to fondle,
molest or force a child to have sexual intercourse. And yet, children are
still being abused.
Victims of this childhood sexual abuse suffer tremendous injuries,
some of which can carry on into adulthood.3 Some of the injuries might
not manifest until years after the abuse has ended. Adults often do not
realize that the psychological problems that plague them day after day, year
after year, are a result of the abuse they suffered through as children.4
When victims make this causal connection, some want to pursue civil
damages so that the defendant can compensate them for their injuries.
Unfortunately, most often the victims' claims are barred by the statute of
limitations. Some jurisdictions apply the discovery rule to toll these
victims' claims, while others do' not. Illinois is one state that does not toll
the statute of limitations for victims of childhood sexual abuse who have
always known of the abuse, but did not make the causal connection with

1.
DIANE H. SCHETKY, M.D. & ARTHUR H. GREEN, M.D., CHILD SEXUAL A BUSE
29 (Brunner/Mazel, Inc., 1988).
2.
Id. at 28.
3.
See infra notes 13-19 and accompanying text for an examination of the types of
injuries that can result from childhood sexual abuse.
4.
This comment will focus on these types of cases.
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5
their injuries and the abuse until after the limitations period had passed.
By doing so, the courts are denying these victims the compensation they
deserve. Illinois should take a more liberal stance in applying the
discovery rule to such cases because of the traumatic nature of the
misconduct and the unique nature of the victims' injuries.
Part I of this article will discuss the nature of childhood sexual abuse,
and the psychological impact it has on its victims. It will also explain the
purpose of statutes of limitations, and begin to explore how many claims
become time-barred. Furthermore, it will also discuss what impact the
discovery rule has on victims' claims. The second part of this article will
discuss how Illinois courts apply their statute of limitations and codified
discovery rule to civil claims brought by adult victims of childhood sexual
abuse. It will explore the courts' interpretation of the statute, as well as
focus on the dissenting point of view. The third section of this article will
discuss case law from other states that are in line with Illinois court
decisions. The fourth section will explore case law from other states that
are in direct disagreement with Illinois, and then compare the conflicting
holdings. Finally, the last part of this article will stress that Illinois needs
to change its views towards certain adult victims of childhood sexual
abuse, either by the Illinois Supreme Court reversing its previous holdings
or by legislative mandate.

I.

CHILDHOOD SEXUAL ABUSE AND ITS VICTIMS

Childhood sexual abuse is the exploitation of a child or adolescent for
another person's sexual gratification. Sexual abuse is committed most
often by individuals that the child knows and trusts, such as family
members, family friends, caregivers, or others who are in a position of
authority.7 By using their relationship with the child, the perpetrator can
easily intimidate or threaten the child into silence after the sexual abuse has
occurred.8
Despite the growing awareness of the child abuse crisis, it is reported
that hundreds of thousands of children are sexually abused each year in the

See infra notes 58-72, and 80-88 and accompanying text for an examination of
5.
how Illinois applies the discovery rule. Note that Illinois does apply the discovery rule in
cases of repressed memories.
1999 NATIONAL VICTIM AsSISTANCE ACADEMY, 6 (Grace Coleman et al. eds.,
6.
(last visited Mar. 13, 2003).
www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ovc/assist/nvaa99/chapl0.htm
at
1999),
7. Id.
Id. at7.
8.
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United States. 9 Unfortunately, many instances of childhood sexual abuse
also go unreported,' ° most often because children lack knowledge of whom
to report the abuse to, they fear retaliation from the abuser, or fear that they
will not be believed."
Children may also be prevented from reporting
abuse because they believe that the abuse is normal, feel shameful or blame
themselves, are threatened by the abuser not to report, or may love the
abuser. 12
There is no doubt that childhood sexual abuse can have severe
physical and emotional ramifications for the victim. As a child, the victim
can experience sleep disturbances, insomnia, nightmares, psychosomatic
disorders, fear and avoidance of males, mistrust, 3 as well as feelings of
shame, guilt, low self-esteem, anger, depression, and even suicide. 14 As an
adult, a victim can still manifest injuries stemming from the childhood
abuse, long after the abuse has ended. Adult victims often experience post
traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), which consists of fear, startle reactions,
anxiety, repetition, reenactment of or flashback to the trauma, sleep
disturbances, depressive symptoms, regression, and maladaptive
expressions of anger. 15 Other psychological difficulties victims often
experience include suicidal behavior, 16 anxiety disorders, alcohol abuse,
and antisocial behavior. 17 Due to the severe trauma of sexual abuse,
victims may also repress the memory of the abuse or force themselves into
denial as a kind of coping mechanism to deal with the suffering they have
endured. 18 Severity of the long-term injuries can vary depending on the
age of the victim, frequency and duration of the abuse, degree of physical

9.

Id. at 1; Lisa Jones & David Finkelhor, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF

JUSTICE: JUVENILE JUSTICE BULLETIN:

THE DECLINE IN CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE CASES

(January 2001), at www.ncjrs.org/html/ojjdp/jjbul200l l1/contents.html (last visited Apr.
23, 2003).
10.
11.

12.
13.

14.
15.

16.

SCHETKY, supra note 1, at 32.
1999 NATIONAL VICTIMS ASSISTANCE ACADEMY, supra note 6, at 17.

Id.
SCHETKY, supra note 1, at 41.
1999 NATIONS VICTIMS ASSISTANCE ACADEMY, supra note 6, at 8.
SCHETKY, supra note 1, at 43.

See Beth S. Brodsky et al., The Relationship of ChildhoodAbuse to Impulsivity

and Suicidal Behavior in Adults With Major Depression, 158 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1871,

1874 (2001).
17. See Harriet

L.

MacMillan

et

al.,

Childhood Abuse and Lifetime

Psychopathologyin a Community Sample, 158 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1878, 1878 (2001).

18.
RECOVERED MEMORIES OF CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE: PSYCHOLOGICAL, SOCIAL,
AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES ON A CONTEMPORARY MENTAL HEALTH CONTROVERSY 55, 67-69

(Sheila Taub ed., 1999).
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trauma, relationship to the perpetrator, preexisting personality factors,
quality of support, and therapeutic intervention. 19
Victims may choose to start therapy to help alleviate the psychological
difficulties they are experiencing. During the course of therapy, the victims
often realize for the first time that their problems are linked to their abusive
history. 20 There are many theories about why victims would not associate
their emotional difficulties with the abuse before therapy. One possibility
is that the victims unconsciously deny to themselves that the abuse took
21
place, and are therefore unable to make this causal connection.
Additionally, the severe feelings of shame that children feel as a response
to the abuse may lead the victims to minimize the trauma and continue to
underestimate the effects of the abuse throughout their lifetime. These
victims often report that the abuse did not affect them in the same way, or
22
as severely, as it would someone else.
This failure to realize the causal relationship between the childhood
sexual abuse and adult victims' psychological difficulties may be to the
detriment of many victims who later seek to gain compensation for their
injuries. Unfortunately, the statute of limitations may bar adult survivors
from pursuing their claims. A statute of limitations bars a cause of action
for a tort after a lapse of time. 23 Typically, the limitations period begins to
run when the tort is complete,24 such as the date of the injury, or in abuse
cases, the date of the abuse.25 Most often, the statute of limitations is tolled
6
until the injured party attains the age of majority.2 The main purpose of a
statute of limitations is to ensure that an action is filed within a reasonable
time to prevent the loss or impairment of evidence and to discourage
delay. 27 Therefore, the statute of limitations promotes accuracy, as well as
fairness to the defendant so that he is not required to defend himself against
28
a stale claim. It has been argued, however, that a statute of limitations is

19.

SCHETKY, supra note 1, at 50.

23.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

20.
21.
22.

Id. at 43.
Id. at43-44.
TAUB, supra note 18, at 70.

§899 (1977).

24. Id. at cmt. c.
25. Rosemarie Ferrante, Note, The Discovery Rule: Allowing Adult Survivors of
Childhood Sexual Abuse the Opportunityfor Redress, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 199, 213 (1995).
26. Gregory G. Gordon, Comment, Adult Survivors of Childhood Sexual Abuse and
the Statute of Limitations: The Need for Consistent Application of the Delayed Discovery
Rule, 20 PEPP. L. REV. 1359, 1371 (1993).

27. Nolan v. Johns-Manville Asbestos, 421 N.E.2d 864 (I1. 1981); Ferrante, supra
note 25, at 201; Gordon, supra note 26, at 1371.
28. See Gordon, supra note 26, at 1371.
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not fair to victims of childhood sexual abuse. 2 9 The typical tort victim is

not similar to the typical sexual abuse victim. Unlike a victim of a simple
battery, whose injury is immediately knowable, many victims of this type
of abuse argue that their injuries are not readily discoverable, even by the
time they reach the age of majority. 0
To alleviate the harsh effects of the application of the statute of
limitations, many jurisdictions have applied the discovery rule to tort
claims. 31 Under Illinois common law, this rule had the effect of postponing
the commencement of the limitations period until the injured party knows
or should have known of her injury. 32 This is the point in time in which the
"injured person becomes possessed of sufficient information concerning
[her] injury and its cause to put a reasonable person on inquiry to determine
whether actionable conduct is involved." 3
The question of when an
injured party should have discovered the existence of her cause of action is
one of fact. 34 Even though this common law discovery rule has been
codified to apply to childhood sexual abuse cases in Illinois,35 the Illinois
Supreme Court has held that it is not to be applied to victims who did not
repress their memories of the abuse. Victims who repress their memories,
however, are not the only victims that want to confront their abusers and
get compensation.
There are two types of childhood sexual abuse victims that seek
redress. The first type consists of victims who were abused as children, but
then repressed all memory of the abuse until later in adulthood when the
memories were recovered, usually during the course of therapy. 37 Many
jurisdictions allow victims of repressed memories to toll the statute of
limitations until the point in time in which their memories are recovered,
reasoning that repression renders the victim "blamelessly ignorant" and
thus, it would be unfair to deny their claim. 38 The second type of victim is
one who did not repress the memories, but instead, did not realize that her

29. Id.; Ferrante, supra note 25; Jocelyn B. Lamm, Note, Easing Access to the
Courtsfor Incest Victims: Toward an EquitableApplication of the Delayed Discovery Rule,
100 YALE L.J. 2189 (1991).
30. Gordon, supra note 26, at 1372.
31.
Knox Coll. v. Celotex Corp., 430 N.E.2d 976, 979 (111. 1981).

32.
33.
34.

Id.
Id. at 980-81.
Id. at981.

35. See 735 ILL. COMp. STAT. ANN. 5/13-202.2(b) (West 1992 & Supp. 2002).
36. See infra notes 58-72 and 80-88 and accompanying text for an examination of
how Illinois courts apply the discovery rule to childhood sexual abuse cases.
37. See Lamm, supra note 29, at 2201.
38. Id. at 2202; see also Gordon, supra note 26, at 1386; Ferrante, supra note 25, at

219-220.
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psychological difficulties in adulthood were caused by the childhood
abuse.39 The source of controversy and lack of uniform application of the
discovery rule, most often, is when the courts are confronted with the
40
second type of case.
II.

ILLINOIS LAW, THE DISCOVERY RULE, AND ADULT SURVIVORS OF
CHILDHOOD SEXUAL ABUSE

The statute of limitations to bring a personal injury claim based on
4
childhood sexual abuse in Illinois is two years. ' The Code provides that
this limitation period does not begin to run until the person abused attains
eighteen years of age.42 This section also codifies the common law
discovery rule, allowing a party to commence an action in childhood sexual
abuse "within 2 years of the date the person abused discovers or through
the use of reasonable diligence should discover that the act of childhood
sexual abuse occurred and that the injury was caused by the childhood
Illinois
sexual abuse. 4 3 Even before the discovery rule was codified, cases.
44
sexual abuse
applied the common law rule to some childhood
Illinois courts justified the use of the common law discovery rule in child
sexual abuse cases where the victim repressed all memories of the abusive
relationship by holding that its application is necessary to alleviate the
harsh results of the statute of limitations, and to promote justice, fairness,
and equity.45
Illinois courts have disagreed on how to apply the codified discovery
rule to adult survivors of childhood sexual abuse. As noted earlier, there
are two types of cases that can arise. The first is when the victim had
repressed all memory of the abuse, and only later in life recalled that she

39. Lamm, supra note 29, at 2201.
40. See generally Lamm, supra note 29; Gordon, supra note 26; Ferrante, supra
note 25.
41. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/13-202.2(b) (West 1992 & Supp. 2002).
42. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/13-202.2(d) (West 1992 & Supp. 2002).
43. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/13-202.2(b) (West 1992 & Supp. 2002).
44. See, e.g., Johnson v. Johnson, 766 F. Supp. 662 (N.D. 11.1991) (applying the
common law discovery rule to toll the statute of limitations for incest victim who repressed
her memories of childhood abuse); Franke v. Geyer, 568 N.E.2d 931 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991)
(applying common law discovery rule to a plaintiff when she was unaware of the causal
connection between the earlier abuse and later injuries until after the statute of limitations
period ran).
App. Ct. 1996); Phillips v.
45. M.E.H. v. L.H., 669 N.E.2d 1228, 1234 (I11.
Johnson, 599 N.E.2d 4, 8 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992).
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was abused.
The second scenario is when the victim always had
knowledge of the abuse, but failed to make the causal connection between
the childhood abuse and her psychological injuries in adulthood until after
the statute of limitations period had passed.4 7 While Illinois has generally
agreed that the discovery rule is applied to cases involving repressed
memories, the conflict arises in the second type of case when the victim
fails to make the causal connection between the abuse and the injury.
Several of Illinois' appellate courts have applied the discovery rule to this
type of case, relying on the language in the statute which states that the
statute of limitations is tolled until the victim "discover[s]... that the act of
childhood sexual abuse occurred and that the injury was caused by the
childhood sexual abuse. ' 49 In two recent Illinois Supreme Court cases,
however, the court ignored the plain meaning of the statute and held that as
long as the victim was aware of the abuse, the limitations period begins to
run at the time the plaintiff reaches the age of majority.50
The reasoning behind the conflicting holdings in cases where the
victim has always known of the abuse warrants evaluation. In D.P. v.
M.J.O., the Illinois Court of Appeals for the First District held that the
discovery rule applies when the victim knew of the abuse and did not
repress the memories. 51 In D.P., a father sexually abused his daughters, the
plaintiffs, for many years, and although they were always aware of the
abuse, they did not file the claim until eleven years after the last abusive act
was committed. 52 The defendant argued that the discovery rule was not
applicable in this case because the victims did not suffer from repression,
but instead had belated discovery of the causal connection between the
abuse as children and psychological problems suffered as adults. 53 The
court rejected the defendant's argument, and applied the discovery rule to
the plaintiffs claim based on both the codified discovery rule and on the
holding in Franke v. Geyer, an Illinois case decided upon the common law

46.
47.

See Lamm, supra note 29, at 2191.
Id.

48. Johnson, 766 F. Supp. at 664; Philips, 599 N.E.2d at 7; Hobert v. Covenant
Children's Home, 723 N.E.2d 384, 386 (I11.
App. Ct. 2000) (applying discovery rule to nonabusers who had a duty to protect the victim); but see M.E.H., 669 N.E.2d 1228, 1234-35
(II1.App. Ct. 1996) (refusing to apply discovery rule in case of repressed memories).
49. See D.P. v. M.J.O, 640 N.E.2d 1323, 1326 (II!. App. Ct. 1994) (quoting 735
ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/13-202.2(b) (West 1992)) (emphasis added); see also Franke v. Geyer,
568 N.E.2d 931, 932 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1991).
50. Parks v. Kownacki, 737 N.E.2d 287, 295 (Ill. 2000); Clay v. Kuhl, 727 N.E.2d
217, 220-21 (I11.
2000).
51.
640 N.E.2d 1323 (11. App. Ct. 1994).
52. Id. at 1324-25.
53. Id. at 1325-26.
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discovery rule. 54 The court in D.P. held that the legislature, in amending
Code section 13-202.2 to codify the discovery rule, "explicitly articulated
that the discovery rule as applied to childhood sexual abuse applied both to
the fact that the abuse occurred as well as to the knowledge that the injury
was caused by such abuse. 55 The court also adopted the reasoning in the
Franke case, which held that the discovery rule applies to cases where the
victim had "belated discovery of the connection between the abuse and the
injury as well as to those instances of repressed consciousness of the abuse
itself.",56 The court warned, however, that the plaintiff's pleadings shall be
strictly scrutinized to determine whether the state of the victim's awareness
was such that could reasonably have put her on notice of that nexus
between the abuse and the injuries.57
When the issue came before the Illinois Supreme Court, however, the
court refused to allow victims who always had knowledge of the abuse to
toll the statute of limitations. The court in both Clay v. Kuhl and Parks v.
Kownacki refused to apply the discovery rule to victims who did not
repress the memories of abuse.5 8 In Clay, the victim alleged that her priest
sexually abused her as a minor.59 The plaintiff always had memories of the
abuse, but did not realize, until she underwent therapy as an adult, the
causal relationship between the abuse she suffered and the subsequent
psychological problems she experienced. 60 The claim was not filed until
1994, when the plaintiff was approximately thirty years of age.6' The
defendant moved for dismissal based on the statute of limitations, which
62
would have expired in 1984 when the plaintiff turned twenty years of age.
The trial court granted the dismissal, characterizing the acts of childhood
sexual abuse as "sudden, traumatic events that triggered the running
,,63 of the
limitations period once the victim of the abuse attained majority.
The
Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's determination that the action was
untimely because the plaintiff had "sufficient information about her injury

1991).

54.

Id. at 1326-29; see generally Franke v. Geyer, 568 N.E.2d 931 (Iii. App. Ct.

55. D.P., 640 N.E.2d at 1326.
56. id. at 1327.
57. Id.
58. Clay v. Kuhl, 727 N.E.2d 217 (I11.2000); Parks v. Kownacki, 737 N.E.2d 287
(I11.2000).
59. 727 N.E.2d at 219 (stating specifically that the plaintiff was born in 1964, that
the abuse started in 1972 or 1973, and continued for seven years).
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.; 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/13-202.2(b) (West 1992 & Supp. 2002)
(stating that limitations period expires two years after victim attains age of majority).
63. Clay, 727 N.E.2d at 219-20.
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and its cause to require her to bring suit long before [she did] ."64 The court
she
stressed that the plaintiff did not repress
65 the memories, and therefore,
had knowledge of the abusive injuries.
Although the plaintiff maintained that she was unable to discover the
nature of her injuries, the court in Clay reasoned that Illinois law presumes66
"an intent to harm and a resulting injury" from this type of misconduct.
Additionally, the court stated that "[t]here is no requirement that a plaintiff
must know the full extent of his or her injuries before suit must be brought
under the applicable statute of limitations., 67 Therefore, the limitations
period starts when the injury occurs (the age of majority), rather than when
the plaintiff realizes the consequences, or the full extent of the injury.68
Additionally, in refusing to apply the discovery rule to plaintiff s claim, the
court warned that accepting her argument would "improperly create a
subjective standard by which accrual of a cause of action would have to be
measured." 69
The court in Clay also refused to compare the latent manifestation of
injuries in adult survivors of childhood sexual abuse to injuries sustained in
exposure to asbestos. 7° The plaintiff argued that the discovery rule should
apply to her injuries in the same way the rule is applied to persons exposed
to asbestos, because her injuries are similar to toxic exposure in that they
are slow to develop and unknowable at the time of the occurrence. 71 The
court declined to accept the plaintiff's reasoning because in asbestos cases
the risk of harm is not immediately apparent, and those plaintiffs were
unable to discover any injury until long after it occurred. In sexual abuse
cases, however, the event of the abuse itself creates an immediate
awareness of injury, and the plaintiff in Clay knew that she suffered some
kind of injury at the time of the incident.72
Justice Freeman strongly dissented from the Clay majority. First, he
insisted that the majority erred in assuming that the type of injuries suffered

64. Id.at 221.
65. Id. at 221-22.
66. Id. at 222 (relying on Doe v. Montessori Sch. of Lake Forest, 678 N.E.2d 1082
(III. App. Ct. 1997)).
67. Id. at 222.
68. Id.
2000).
69. Clay v. Kuhl, 727 N.E.2d 217, 223 (I11.
70. Id. at 222.
Id.; see generally Nolan v. Johns-Manville Asbestos, 421 N.E.2d 864 (Ii. 1981)
71.
(holding that the discovery rule can be applied to a plaintiff who was exposed to asbestos
while on the job, and who knew of the exposure, but not that his lung injuries were the result
of the exposure).
72. 727 N.E.2d at 223.
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by victims of sexual abuse are "sudden and traumatic," in that the nature of
the injury is such that the "plaintiff knows or should know that someone
may be legally responsible for it." 73 Instead, he categorized the plaintiffs
injuries as "disease" type injuries, in which the injuries do not "themselves
put the plaintiff on notice that someone may be legally at fault., 74 In other
words, the psychological injuries plaintiff suffered from were slow to
develop and were not apparent until much later. He argued that in disease
cases, the limitations period does not begin when the victim learns of the
injury, but instead begins to run when she knows or has reason
to know of
75
the injury and also that someone may be responsible for it.
Justice Freeman also claimed that the majority did not give a factual
basis for its conclusion that the plaintiff was aware of her injury when the
abusive acts took place.76 The majority ignored the plaintiffs allegations
that her injuries developed later in life, and that as of 1994, she was
unaware that her psychological difficulties were related to the childhood
abuse. 77 He emphasized that remembering the events, which were
ultimately found to have caused injury, does not necessarily establish
awareness of a link between the event and the injury. 78 Finally, Justice
Freeman argued that "at some past moment in time, unknown and
inherently unknowable even in retrospect, plaintiff was charged with
knowledge of the slow and tragic disintegration of her mind. 79
The court in Parks v. Kownacki followed the reasoning in Clay, also
holding that the discovery rule is not applicable to adult victims of sexual
abuse who knew of the abuse, and thus, should have known that they were
injured. 80 Parks claimed that her church reverend sexually abused her as a
minor. The abuse continued for many years, and was accompanied by

73. Id. at 225.
74. Id.
75. Id. (citing Witherrell v. Weimer, 396 N.E.2d 268 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979)).
76. Id.
77. Clay v. Kuhl, 727 N.E.2d 217, 226 (I11.2000).
78. Id. at 227 (referring also to Nolan v. Johns-Manville Asbestos, 421 N.E.2d 864
(Ill. 1981)). Justice Freeman said that the plaintiff's complaint in that case would have been
untimely because "he was always aware that he had worked with asbestos and was aware of
physical problems as early as 18 years before filing his complaint" 727 N.E.2d at 227; see
also Franke v. Geyer, 568 N.E.2d 931, 933 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (comparing childhood sexual
abuse injuries to asbestos injuries in that both types of victims do not discover the causal
link between the trauma and the injury until the statute of limitations period expires).
79. 727 N.E.2d at 228.
80. Parks v. Kownacki, 737 N.E.2d 287, 294 (IIl. 2000).
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When the
threats, physical abuse, mental abuse, and a forced abortion.
her to
told
he
plaintiff told an employee of the Diocese about the abuse,
82 The church
"forgive Kownacki and forget" about what had happened.
employee even performed a ceremony that the plaintiff believed would
83
help her to accomplish this forgiveness.
Parks admitted that she always had memory of some of the abuse she
suffered (although she said she did repress some incidents from memory),
but argued that both her fear for the defendant and the ceremony facilitated
her failure to understand the cause of her injuries and rendered her
"psychiatrically incapable of pursuing her claims ... prior to the filing of
this complaint., 84 Therefore, the plaintiff alleged that the limitations period
did not begin to run on her complaint until she made the causal connection
between the abuse and her psychological injuries.85 The court, however,
rejected the plaintiffs reasoning because she was aware of some injury.
For example, the court pointed out that the forced abortion was an obvious
injury and the plaintiff should have been aware that it was an injury at the
time it occurred.86 The court relied on Clay in holding that when a victim
of childhood sexual abuse "was aware of the abuse as it occurred and does
not allege that she repressed the memories of that abuse, the limitations
,,87
period begins to run at the time the plaintiff reaches the age of majority.
Additionally, the court stated that this case has even stronger facts to
warrant dismissal than Clay because the plaintiffs awareness of injury is
more evident.8 8

Id. at 290-292. Plaintiff alleged that most of the abuse occurred while she lived
81.
with the defendant, which consisted of sexual, emotional and physical abuse, including a
forced abortion that defendant did himself at his rectory.
82. Id. at 291. The Diocese never reported the abuse to the police.
83. Id. at 291-92. The ceremony took place at the church, where an employee of
the Diocese anointed the plaintiff with oil and told her once again to forgive and forget.
Plaintiff testified that after the ceremony she felt "as though a huge burden had been
removed from her shoulders."
84. Id. (stating that plaintiff maintained that she "did not realize that her sexual
relationship with Kownacki was sexual abuse or that she had been injured by that abuse."
Both the ceremony and the failure to discipline Kownacki acted as psychiatric restraint on
Parks, and she was unable to "make decisions, or exercise judgment, about any of the sexual
and physical abuse that she suffered at the hands of Father Kownacki.").
85. Parks v. Kownacki, 737 N.E.2d 287, 295 (11. 2000). Plaintiff testified that she
did not link her psychological difficulties with the abuse until a social service agency
contacted her years later inquiring if the defendant had abused her. Plaintiff suffered from
PTSD, physical injuries from the abortion, low self-esteem, loss of enjoyment of life and
earning potential, depression, nightmares, loss of sleep, and poor personal relationships.
86. Id. at 295.
87. Id. at 294.
88. Id. at 295 (referring to abortion as an obvious physical injury).
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Interestingly, the dissenting justice in Clay concurred with the
majority opinion in Parks. Justice Freeman agreed with the result in Parks,
but stated that he disagreed with the majority's reasoning. 89 Freeman
agreed that the plaintiff was aware of some injury before 1995, but
distinguished Parks from the facts in Clay because in the latter case, the
victim "alleged that the sexual conduct with her abuser was not forcible
and she was never physically harmed." 90
Justice Freeman's opinion is that the discovery rule should be applied
to toll the running of the limitations period for victims of childhood sexual
abuse who were reasonably unaware of the causal connection between the
abuse and the latent psychological injuries. 91 When incidents of injury are
obvious, however, like an abortion as in Parks, Justice Freeman seems to
believe that the discovery rule should not apply because the victim was
obviously aware that some type of injury occurred as a result of the abuse.92
In other words, the discovery rule would apply if the plaintiff was
reasonable in her failure to make the causal connection, and this would be
determined on a case-by-case basis according to each plaintiffs unique
facts. Justice Freeman's reasoning is inconsistent with the Illinois Supreme
Court's ruling, which held that injury is presumed when one is abused, and
therefore, the discovery rule is not applicable when the victim retains
memory of the abuse.93
III. JURISDICTIONS

IN AGREEMENT WITH ILLINOIS' APPLICATION
DISCOVERY RULE IN CHILDHOOD SEXUAL ABUSE CASES

OF THE

There are some jurisdictions that, like Illinois, do not apply the
discovery rule to toll the statute of limitations for adult survivors who
always had knowledge that they were sexually abused as a child.94

89. Id. at 297 (stating that he "continue[s] to adhere to my belief that Clay was
wrongly decided. Nevertheless, the facts in this case differ so dramatically from the facts in
Clay, that I concur that dismissal is appropriate here").
90. Id.
91. See supra text accompanying notes 73-79 and 89-90 for an explanation of
Justice Freeman's opinions in Clay and Parks.
92. See supra note 90.
93. See supra text accompanying notes 58-72 and 80-88 for an examination of how
Illinois courts apply the discovery rule to childhood sexual abuse cases.
94. See generally Blackowiak v Kemp, 546 N.W.2d I (Minn. 1996); J.J. v.
Luckow, 578 N.W.2d 17 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998); D.M.S. v. Barber, 627 N.W.2d 369 (Minn.
Ct. App. 2001); Doe v. Shults-Lewis Child and Family Servs. Inc., 718 N.E.2d 738 (Ind.
1999); Hildebrand v. Hildebrand, 736 F.Supp. 1512 (S.D. Ind. 1990); Hammer v. Hammer,
418 N.W.2d 23 (Wis. App. Ct. 1987) (applying use of the discovery rule only to those cases
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Minnesota has a special discovery statute for cases of sexual abuse. Its
statute allows plaintiffs to file suit within six years of the time they "knew95
sexual abuse.,
or had reason to know that the injury was caused by the
This statute is similar to the Illinois discovery statute for childhood sexual
abuse cases because both appear to toll the statute of limitations until the
96
plaintiff knows of the injury and its cause. Minnesota, like Illinois, does
not apply this statute when the victim did not repress the memory, but was
always aware of the abuse.97
The Supreme Court of Minnesota, in Blackowiak v. Kemp, for the first
time addressed the issue of applying its codified discovery rule to a case
where the victim did not realize the link between his injuries and the
childhood abuse. 98 The court reversed the appellate court and held that the
discovery rule would not be applied to the plaintiff.99 The plaintiff was
eleven years old when a school counselor abused him. He told his friend
about the abuse and informed his mother that the defendant did something
"wrong to him."' ° The plaintiff alleged that it was not until twenty years
later that he attributed his feelings of shame and drug and alcohol
dependency to being molested as a child, and so the statute of limitations
should begin to run at the time that he made this connection.10 1 The court
disagreed and held that "the nature of criminal sexual conduct is such that
an intention to inflict injury can be inferred as a matter of law," and "as a
matter of law, one is injured if one is sexually abused."'1 2 The court also
held that the discovery rule is not to be subjectively applied. The test is not
when the victim acknowledged or appreciated the nature and extent of the
harm resulting from the abuse, but is instead an objective test of when the
plaintiff knew or should have known that he was sexually abused.'0 3 This
objective test is evaluated by a reasonable person standard, and the court

in which the crimes were incestuous); Doe v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 565 N.W.2d 94
(Wis. 1997) (holding that the courts decision in Hammer is not applicable to victims of
childhood sexual abuse that did not occur in an incestuous relationship).
95. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 541.0732(a) (West 2000).
96. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/13-202.2(b) (West 1992 & Supp. 2002).
97. Blackowiak, 546 N.W.2d at 2; J.J., 578 N.W.2d at 19; D.M.S., 627 N.W.2d at
373; Clay v. Kuhl, 727 N.E.2d 217, 221 (Ill. 2000); Parks v. Kownacki, 737 N.E.2d 287,
294 (I11. 2000).
98. 546 N.W.2d at 2.
99. Id. at 3.
100. Id. at 2.
101. Id.
2000).
102. Id. at 3; see also Parks v. Kownacki, 737 N.E.2d 287 (I11.
103. Blackowiak v. Kemp, 546 N.W.2d 1, 3 (Minn. 1996).
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held that a reasonable person knows of the injury at the time the abuse
occurs.

104

One justice dissented from the majority Blackowiak opinion. Justice
Gardebring found fault with the majority's equal treatment of moral
knowledge of wrongdoing and legal concepts of injury and causation.' 0 5
She stated that the majority misread the statute of limitations by not
acknowledging its plain meaning that knowledge of causation triggers the
limitation period, not knowledge that the abuse occurred. 10 6 Justice
Gardebring emphasized that the knowledge of the sexual abuse or personal
injury "is not central; it is the link between them, the causation, one of the
other, which must be considered in order to determine whether a lawsuit is
within the limitations period."' 7 She stated that the majority is taking
away from the fact finder the issue of when the plaintiff knew or should
have known that the emotional injuries were caused by the abuse that
occurred years earlier.' ° 8 She would not have dismissed the complaint as
untimely because "a reasonable person could find that respondent did not
know, nor had reason to know, that the emotional injuries he was
experiencing were caused by earlier sexual abuse."' 10 9
Since the Blackowiak opinion, the Minnesota Court of Appeals has
held that plaintiffs who were aware of the abuse are denied the use of the
discovery rule." 0 It reaffirmed the understanding that injury is presumed
when the abuse occurs, and that the victim is "immediately put on notice of
the causal connection between the abuse and the injury so that the statute of
limitations begins to run once a victim is abused."" I Incapability of
understanding the nature of the sexual abuse and the extent of the injuries

104. Id. at 3 (stating that the plaintiff was aware of the shame and abusive nature of
the relationship, and a reasonable person would have known or should have known from the
feelings of shame that he was injured).
105. Id.
106. Id. at4.
107. Id. (disagreeing also with the majority's assumption that shame is the same as
knowing the causal connection between the childhood sexual abuse and dysfunction later in
life).
108. Blackowiak, 546 N.W.2d at 4.
109. Id.
110. J.J. v. Luchow, 578 N.W.2d 17 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that the statute
of limitations should not be tolled for plaintiff because feelings of guilt and self-blame are
enough to put a victim on inquiry that he was injured); D.M.S. v. Barber, 627 N.W.2d 369
(Minn. Ct. App. 2001) (reaffirming that as a matter of law, one is injured when one is
abused).
111. D.M.S., 627 N.W.2d at 373; J.J., 578 N.W.2d at 19-20 (disregarding therapist's
testimony that the plaintiff suffered from confusion, guilt, and self-blame, which precluded
him from realizing that he had been victimized by a trusting authority figure).
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does not toll the statute of limitations. These courts did, however, make an
exception in instances of repressed memories, which2 would constitute a
legal disability adequate to toll the limitations period.'"
The Minnesota courts, like Illinois, do not apply the discovery rule to
cases where adult victims of childhood sexual abuse were aware of the
abuse, but failed to make the causal connection between the abuse and the
injuries. Both states presume injury when the abuse occurs, which puts a
victim on notice that she was abused.' 13 They have also determined that a
reasonable person should have known that they were injured at the time of
the abuse. 4 This reasoning, however, has been criticized for not
adequately acknowledging the psychological nature of the injuries and their
latent development.' 15
IV. JURISDICTIONS NOT IN AGREEMENT WITH ILLINOIS' APPLICATION OF
THE DISCOVERY RULE IN CHILDHOOD SEXUAL ABUSE CASES

Many jurisdictions have adopted the discovery rule for childhood
sexual abuse victims who did not discover the causal connection between
the abuse and their injuries until later in life." 6 A Wyoming court asked
whether the victim of abuse "must be charged with knowledge of her
psychic trauma simply because she admittedly was aware of the physical
trauma." ' 17 The same court held that the jury must decide if the results of
the abuse were reasonably undiscoverable, and if so, then the statute of
limitations would not begin to run until the damage is identified." 8

112. D.M.S., 627 N.W.2d at 373; J.J., 578 N.W.2d at 19.
113. Clay v. Kuhl, 727 N.E.2d 217, 222 (III. 2000); Blackowiak v. Kemp, 546
N.W.2d 1, 3 (Minn. 1996).
114. Clay v. Kuhl, 727 N.E.2d 217, 223 (Ill. 2000); Parks v. Kownacki, 737 N.E.2d
287, 295 (I11.
2000); Blackowiak v. Kemp, 546 N.W.2d 1, 3 (Minn. 1996).
115. See Clay v. Kuhl, 727 N.E.2d 217, 226-27 (Ill.
2000) (Freeman, J.dissenting);
Blackowiak v. Kemp, 546 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Minn. 1996) (Gardenbring, J.dissenting).
116. See generally McCreary v. Weast, 971 P.2d 974, 980 (Wyo. 1999); Osland v.
Osland, 442 N.W.2d 907 (N.D. 1989); Ross v. Garabedian, 742 N.E.2d 1046, 1049 (Mass.
2001); Cosgriffe v Cosgriffe 864 P.2d 776 (Mont. 1993); Tobin v. Damian, 772 So. 2d 13
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000); Dunlea v. Dappen, 924 P.2d 196 (Haw. 1996); Frideres v Schiltz,
540 N.W.2d 261 (Iowa 1995); Shirley v. Reif, 920 P.2d 405 (Kan. 1996); Hollmann v
Corcoran, 949 P.2d 386 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997); Keene v. Edie, 909 P.2d 1311 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1995).
117. McCreary, 971 P.2d at 980 (tolling the statute of limitations for a thirty-six year
old woman who suffered from PTSD, and who first realized the causal connection eleven
years after the abuse ended).
118. Id. at981.

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 23

Over a decade ago, the North Dakota Supreme Court confronted the
issue of applying the discovery rule to a woman who was abused by her
father about seven years before bringing her claim." 19 The court in Osland
held that the "severe emotional trauma" from the sexual abuse rendered her
unable to "fully understand or discover her cause of action during the
applicable statutory time period."'' 20 Therefore, the court applied the
discovery rule to her claim, holding that it would toll the statute of
limitations until the time that the plaintiff
knew or reasonably should have
2
known that a potential claim existed.1 1
More recently, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts applied
the discovery rule to toll the statute of limitations for a victim of childhood
sexual abuse who knew he had been abused, but not that the abuse was the
cause of his subsequent psychological injuries. The court in Ross v.
Garabedian held that under the state's discovery statute, the plaintiff's
cause of action does not accrue until he knew, or should have known, that
he was harmed by the defendant's conduct.122 The Massachusetts statute of
limitations provision states that a victim of childhood sexual abuse has
three years after reaching age eighteen to file a claim, or "within three
years of the time the victim discovered or reasonably should have
discovered that an emotional or psychological injury or condition was
caused by said act."' 23 In Ross, the male plaintiff was thirteen years old
when a twenty-seven year old male started to sexually abuse him. 24 The
plaintiff suffered from PTSD, was unable to maintain a meaningful
relationship, and felt guilt and shame over what he admitted was a "wrong"
relationship.125 His therapist testified that the plaintiff utilized unconscious
coping mechanisms, common to victims of sexual abuse, that made the
plaintiff unable to recognize the causal link between the defendant's
abusive conduct and the plaintiffs psychological injuries. 126 The court,
therefore, held that even though ihe plaintiff was aware of the abuse and
that the relationship was improper, the discovery rule tolls the running of

119. Osland, 442 N.W.2d 907.
120. Id. at 908.
121. Id. at 909 (holding also that the question of when plaintiff discovered or should
have discovered her injury is a question of fact).
122. 742 N.E.2d 1046, 1048 (Mass. 2001).
123. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 260, § 4C (West 1992 & Supp. 1996).
124. 742 N.E.2d at 1047.
125. Id. at 1047-48.
126. Id. at 1047.

20031

ADULT SURVIVORS OF SEXUAL ABUSE

the statute of limitations until the plaintiff knew, or reasonably should
have
127
known of the causal connection between his injuries and the abuse.
The Montana legislature also codified the discovery rule to apply to
childhood sexual abuse cases. Its statute, similar to Illinois', states that the
limitations period, subject to discovery, commences "[three] years after the
plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have discovered that the injury was
caused by the act of childhood sexual abuse."' 128 In Cosgriffe v. Cosgriffe,
the Montana Supreme Court held that this discovery provision applies to
victims who always had memory of the abuse, but who were unable to
make the causal connection between the abuse and her injuries.' 29 In
Cosgriffe, the plaintiff was forty-one years old when she filed suit against
her father for abuse that occurred during her teenage years.' 30 She alleged
that as a result of the abuse she suffered psychological injuries, such as
damage to her self-esteem, inability to maintain employment or meaningful
relationships, drug and alcohol dependency, and sexual promiscuity, all of
which she did not realize were caused by the abuse until she entered
therapy a short time before filing the complaint. 131 The court, in allowing
the discovery rule to be applied to these facts stated that its reasoning was
based on the plain meaning of the statute.' 32 It held that the statute
expressly allows the plaintiff to bring claims for childhood sexual abuse
within three years of discovering that the injuries alleged were caused by
the abuser because the plain meaning of the statute "cannot lead to an
interpretation that the... [plaintiff s] action accrued upon her awareness of
the injury
and there is no requirement of discovery of the cause of the
' 133
injury.
These courts' holdings, among others, are in direct conflict with the
Illinois Supreme Court's holding not to allow victims with intact memories
of the sexual abuse endured in childhood the use of the discovery rule to

127. Id. at 1049-50. (stating that the knowledge that the relationship was wrong and
that the plaintiff felt shame is not enough to constitute harm to trigger the statute of
limitations because the feelings of shame could stem from other factors, e.g. that it was a
homosexual relationship and viewed by the church as immoral).
128. MONT CODE. ANN. § 27-2-216 (1992). Compare with 735 ILL. COMP. STAT.
5/13-202.2 which states that the statute of limitations period commences "within 2 years of
the date the person abused discovers or through the use of reasonable diligence should
discover that the act of childhood sexual abuse occurred and that the injury was caused by
the childhood sexual abuse."
129. 864 P.2d 776 (Mont. 1993).
130. Id. at 777.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 780.
133. Id.
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allow them redress as adults. 134 Although they have similar discovery
rules, their interpretations of the rule's application differ dramatically.
V.

ILLINOIS SHOULD CHANGE ITS POLICY To ALLOW MORE VICTIMS
THE OPPORTUNTIY FOR REDRESS

The Illinois Supreme Court should eliminate the unfair distinction in
applying the discovery rule to some childhood sexual abuse cases but not
others. The distinction between victims who repress memories and those
who fail to realize that their injuries were caused by the abuse is unfair and
is ignored in many jurisdictions. 135 Illinois denies these victims their right
to damages by reasoning that injury is presumed at the time of the abusive
act and that a reasonable person should have known that they were injured
at that time. This reasoning, however, is seriously flawed. Most often the
nature of the injuries prevent adult victims from understanding that their
136
psychological difficulties are the result of their abuse as a child.
Perpetratois of child sexual abuse are often people that their victims know
and admire. Thus, child victims have problems understanding what is
happening and utilize psychological coping mechanisms to help them live
through their suffering. These coping techniques carry on into adulthood,
and further inhibit the victims' understanding that they were emotionally
and psychologically injured and prevents them from comprehending the
long-term effect of their abuse. Just because the victims are aware of the
physical acts does not mean that they are aware of their mental injuries as
well. Many victims even deny to themselves that they were injured
physically. Victims who cannot understand their injuries, or even that they
exist, should not be punished by Illinois courts when trying to get
compensation within a reasonable time after they realize that the abuser is
responsible for their injuries.
Illinois courts also deny victims relief because it has held that a
reasonable person should have known that they were injured at the time of
the abuse.' The court held that it is reasonable for victims to repress their

134. See supra notes 58-72, and 80-88 and accompanying text for an examination of
how Illinois applies the discovery rule to childhood sexual abuse cases.
135. See supra notes 116-133 and accompanying text for jurisdictions not in
agreement with Illinois.
136. See supra notes 13-19 and accompanying text for a description of the various
injuries victims suffer from, and notes 20-23 and accompanying text for a discussion of why
victims do not understand the causal connection between the abuse and the injuries.
137. See Clay v. Kuhl, 727 N.E.2d 217, 222-223 (I11.2000); Parks v. Kownacki, 737
N.E.2d 287, 295 (II1.2000).
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memories of the abuse, but it is not reasonable for victims to fail to
recognize the link between their injuries and the abuse. This is an unfair
distinction. The Illinois Supreme Court in Clay was concerned that
applying the discovery rule to these victims would create a subjective test
of what constitutes a reasonable person, instead of an objective one., 38 The
court, however, did not discuss how plaintiffs could meet the reasonable
standard requirements. It only made the conclusion that the victims are not
reasonable, and does not support its holding with any facts. The court does
not give any examples of when a victim could be reasonable in the delay of
the discovery of her injuries, except for when she represses the memories
of the abuse.
Not knowing of the tortious act itself, however, is not the only
instance in which the court can apply the discovery rule to toll the
limitations period on a plaintiff s claim. For example, plaintiffs who were
exposed to asbestos, even though they knew of the exposure at the time
they came into contact with the toxin, can use the discovery rule. 139 This is
because they were unaware of the harmful effects of the exposure, until
their injuries developed years later. Some children may know that the
abusive conduct is wrong while others may not. By the time they reach the
age of majority they may know that the acts were illegal. Most victims will
try to leave their abusive history in the past, and move on with their lives.
Many, however, do not discover until they are well into adulthood that the
abuse has injured them psychologically. The court should realize that a
reasonable person may not know that the mental and emotional difficulties
they suffer from, years after the abuse has ended, were caused by their
abusive past.
Additionally, the reasonable person standard should not be applied to
victims of childhood sexual abuse. The standard is not appropriate to use
for these victims because the victim of such acts cannot be compared to a
reasonable person. 40 Again, due to the extraordinarily traumatic nature of
the abuse and the depth of psychological injuries, the victim herself, and
how she rationalizes the abuse, is far from reasonable. Because of the
unique experiences and psychological trauma victims endure, Illinois
courts should create a new standard of reasonableness for victims of
childhood sexual abuse. They should ask if a victim of childhood sexual
abuse should have known that she was injured and the injuries were caused
by the abuse.' 4' If such a test were used, then the court would adequately

138.
139.
140.
141.

Clay v. Kuhl, 727 N.E.2d 217, 223 (Ill. 2000).
See Nolan v. Johns-Manville Asbestos, 421 N.E.2d 864 (IIl. 1981).
See generally Lamm, supra note 29.
Id.
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take into account the unique psychological disability the plaintiff developed
as a result of the abuse. The harsh effects of the statute of limitations
would be eliminated, and a victim who never repressed the abuse would be
treated fairly.
Even if the Illinois Supreme Court is unwilling to impose a more
liberal reasonableness standard to adult victims of childhood sexual abuse,
it should at least treat the issue of whether or not the victim was reasonable
as a question for the trier of fact. The question of whether or not to apply
the discovery rule to toll the statute of limitations is generally a question of
fact, unless the facts are sufficient from the pleadings that only one
conclusion can be made.1 42 Illinois courts, however, are concluding as a
matter of law that the victims are unreasonable. At the very least, plaintiffs
should be allowed to argue their case to a jury, who may ultimately find
that they were reasonable in not recognizing the connection between their
current injuries and the earlier abuse.
In addition to the flawed Illinois Supreme Courts' rationale, it is also
ignoring the plain meaning of the discovery statute. The statute states that
the limitations period is tolled until the victim "discover[s] that the act of
childhood sexual abuse occurred and that the injury was caused by the
childhood sexual abuse."1 43 On the face of the statute there appears to be
two prongs that the plaintiff must show to toll the statute of limitations.
The first prong is that the victim knows of the injury and, the second, is a
causation prong in that the injuries were caused by the abuse. The Illinois
Appellate Court's First District construed the second prong of the statute in
such a way as to toll the limitations period for a plaintiff who did not
discover until later in adulthood that her 4psychological injuries were caused
Other state supreme courts, with
by the acts of childhood sexual abuse.'
strikingly similar statutes, also held that the plain meaning of the statute
encompasses claims from victims who were always aware of the abuse, but
failed to make the causal connection. 45 By denying these plaintiffs relief,
the Illinois Supreme Court is misreading the statute. The statute states that
the limitations period is tolled until the plaintiff knew of the causal
of just the
connection between the abuse and the injuries, and so knowledge
14
1
limitations.
of
statute
the
trigger
to
enough
abusive act is not

142. Id. at 868-69; Clay, 727 N.E.2d at 221.
143. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/13-202.2(b) (West 1992 & Supp. 2002).
144. See D.P. v. M.J.O., 640 N.E.2d 1323 (II1.App. Ct. 1994).
145. McCreary v. Weast, 971 P.2d 974, 980 (Wyo. 1999); Cosgriffe v. Cosgriffe,
864 P.2d 776, 780 (Mont. 1993).
146. 735 ILL. CoMP. STAT. ANN. 5/13-202.2(b) (West 1992 & Supp. 2002).
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Because the Illinois Supreme Court refuses to apply the discovery rule
more liberally, the Illinois legislature should be encouraged to amend the
existing statute. It should change the statute to create an opportunity for
the victims to gain the compensation they deserve, as a matter of fairness
and justice. For example, the Massachusetts legislature codified its
childhood sexual abuse discovery rule so that the limitations period would
commence once the victim "discovered that an emotional or psychological
injury or condition was caused by said act [of abuse]." ,,47 By creating a
distinction between physical injury and psychological injury, the legislature
undermines the rationale that injury is presumed upon the act of abuse
because the victims' knowledge of the physical injury is not taken into
consideration. The Illinois statute should be amended to include language
that refers to psychological injuries. By adopting such language, the
legislature would recognize that psychological injuries are not as readily
discoverable as physical injuries. The language would ultimately eliminate
both the importance of plaintiffs' memories of the sexually abusive acts,
and the distinction between victims who repress and those who do not. 148
CONCLUSION

Childhood sexual abuse is a prevalent problem in our society. Often
times because of the nature of the conduct, however, the abuse and the
resultant injuries go unseen. Victims suffer tremendous psychological
injuries, which in themselves work to prevent the victims from realizing
that the psychological, emotional, and social problems they suffer later in
life were caused by the abuse. These victims should not be denied
compensation, and the perpetrators should not escape liability.
Illinois courts are limiting victims' right to bring civil actions against
their abusers. By not applying the discovery rule to victims who were
always aware of their injuries but not that their injuries were caused by the
abuse, Illinois is disregarding basic principles of fairness, justice and
equity. Victims of childhood sexual abuse suffer through tremendous
trauma and those who never repress the memories of the abuse should not
be denied recovery. The coping mechanisms that many victims employ
make them unable to discover the link between the abusive acts and their
emotional injuries. In this context, it is unreasonable to assume that the
nature of the act itself gives rise to the awareness of an injury.

147.

MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.

ch. 260, § 4C (West 1992 & Supp. 1996).

148. This does not mean that victims who knew that their psychological injuries
were caused by the abuse should be allowed to use the discovery rule.
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Additionally, the Illinois Supreme Court should not ignore that the plain
meaning of the discovery statute, which dictates that the limitations period
is tolled until the victim discovers that her injuries were caused by the
abusive acts. Illinois needs to take a more liberal stance in its application
of the discovery rule to allow more victims of sexual abuse the opportunity
to get the compensation they deserve.
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